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This paper looks to answer the question: Can the contentious politics thesis of 
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly explain why the Good Friday 
Agreement (1998) (GFA) successfully produced a lasting peace in Northern 
Ireland, when the Sunningdale (1973) and the Anglo-Irish (1985) agreements 
failed to do so? I set out to study the buildup and aftermath of each agreement and 
subsequently examine each through the lens of the contentious politics thesis, 
searching for causal mechanisms and processes that explain the success of the 
GFA. The purpose of the contentious politics thesis is not to examine various 
forms of contention (i.e. coups, civil wars, revolutions) one by one and make 
broad generalizations for each of them. Quite the opposite; the goal is to “identify 
parallels in the ways that apparently disparate forms of contention work, and 
show how their differences result from varying combinations and sequences of 
mechanisms in contrasting regime environments” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). In 
place of the “static, single-actor models (including their own) that have prevailed 
in the field of contentious politics,” McAdam, Tarrrow, and Tilly identify causal 
mechanisms and processes that recur across a wide-range of contentious politics 
and “shift the focus of analysis to dynamic interaction.”  
 
The main method I used for this work was researching books and articles written 
on the subject. This includes primary source documents, in particular the memoirs 
of people participating in the events discussed and newspaper articles published at 
the time. The books and articles generally fell into two categories: the historical 
record and material related to the contentious politics thesis. McAdam, Tilly, and 
Tarrow’s Dynamics of Contention and Tilly and Tarrow’s Contentious Politics 
were essential for the identification of the causal mechanisms and processes. Paul 
Dixon’s Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace provided me with a 
highly accessible and detailed history of the “Troubles.” With the large amount of 
information available on Northern Ireland, combined with the works of McAdam, 
Tilly, and Tarrow, research was the best and most appropriate method for 
completing my Capstone Project.  
 
I argue that the contentious politics thesis furthers our understanding of the 
triumphs and failures of each agreement and helps explain why it took three 
decades to broker a lasting peace. As I demonstrate, recognizing the causal 
mechanisms and processes improves our comprehension of how each agreement 
came into existence and why the GFA was the only one to experience long-term 
success. The object shift by the nationalist community, the co-optation of Sinn 
Féin into the peace talks, and the identity shift by the Republic of Ireland are some 
examples of the causal mechanisms and processes that distinguished the GFA 
from Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I also apply the thesis to the 
Bosnian War (1992-95) to exemplify how it allows us to identify causal 
mechanisms and processes in both Bosnia and Northern Ireland and subsequently 
critically compare the two dissimilar conflicts. 
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The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the Sunningdale, the 
Anglo-Irish, and the Good Friday Agreements of Northern Ireland through the 
lens of the contentious politics thesis of Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and 
Charles Tilly. The Sunningdale, Anglo-Irish, and Good Friday Agreements 
emerged during the course of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland and all strove to 
engineer a peace between the feuding nationalist and unionist communities. This 
work argues that the contentious politics thesis furthers our understanding of the 
triumphs and failures of each agreement and helps explain why it took three 
decades to broker a lasting peace. The paper will first provide an introduction to 
the contentious politics thesis, then a concise summary of Ireland’s contentious 
history from 1600 to the division of Ireland into North and South in 1922. Next, it 
will present a brief summary of the background and general reaction to each 
agreement, followed by the examination of the similarities and differences of the 
settlements, and then it will identify causal mechanisms and processes in the build 
up and aftermath of each agreement to demonstrate the contentious politics thesis’ 
dynamic and progressive approach to studying contentious politics. Finally, it 
provides a section that compares the Bosnian War (1992-95) to the “Troubles” to 
help illustrate how the same causal mechanisms and processes can be identified in 
two distinct conflicts and ends with my conclusions.1 As I will demonstrate, 
recognizing the causal mechanisms and processes improves our comprehension of 
                                                 
1
 To make clear what mechanisms and processes are being discussed, I italicize them throughout 
the text. A full glossary for the mechanisms and processes discussed is available at the back of this 
work in Appendix 1. Also included is a list of the abbreviations used throughout the work. This is 
in Appendix 2. 
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how each agreement came into existence and why the Good Friday Agreement 
was the only one to experience long-term success.   
 
 
Figure 1: Ireland (left) and Northern Ireland. Source: U.S. Department of State, “Ireland 
Country Specific Information” (left picture). Infoplease.com, “Map: United Kingdom” 
(right picture). 
 
The Contentious Politics Thesis 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly developed the contentious politics thesis after 
continual frustration with the compartmentalization of studies concerning political 
struggle. In place of the “static, single-actor models (including their own) that 
have prevailed in the field,” they identify causal mechanisms and processes that 
recur across a wide-range of contentious politics and “shift the focus of analysis 
to dynamic interaction” (2001). This is not a theory, for as Tilly and Tarrow state 
in their book Contentious Politics, “the contentious politics approach looks 
deliberately for similarities in cause-effect relationships across the wide range of 
political struggles without aiming for general laws that govern all of politics” 
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(2007). The purpose of the thesis is not to examine various forms of contention 
(i.e. coups, civil wars, revolutions) one by one and make broad generalizations for 
each of them. Quite the opposite, the goal is to “identify parallels in the ways that 
apparently disparate forms of contention work, and show how their differences 
result from varying combinations and sequences of mechanisms in contrasting 
regime environments” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). The thesis allows us to recognize 
trends amid various types of conflicts. It argues that, though contentious situations 
exist on a wide spectrum, similar causal mechanisms and processes are present in 
all of them, which helps to explain how contentious events occur. I use the 
conflict in Northern Ireland as a case study to test the thesis and determine if 
identifying causal mechanisms and processes in the buildup and aftermath of each 
agreement can explain why the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) was the only one 
to experience relatively long-term success. Tilly and Tarrow define mechanisms 
as “a delimited class of events that alter relations among specified sets of 
elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations” (2007). 
Mechanisms compound into processes, which “are regular combinations and 
sequences of mechanisms that produce similar transformations of those elements” 
(2007). As I illustrate below, recognizing causal mechanisms and processes that 
occurred during the buildup and aftermath of the GFA does explain why it held up 
compared to the previous two agreements. The object shift by the nationalist 
community, the co-optation of Sinn Féin into the peace talks, and the identity shift 
by the Republic of Ireland are some examples of the causal mechanisms and 
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processes that I discuss at length that help clarify what distinguished the GFA 
from Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA).  
 
Historical Background 
 The long contentious history between the British and Irish dates back to 
the Norman invasion of Ireland in 1169. Over 800 years later Ireland is still 
divided between the British ruled North and an Irish Republic in the South. 
Although the Normans first invaded Ireland in 1169, the Irish lived relatively 
undisturbed until the 17th Century. Under James I (r.1603-1625) the colonization 
of Ireland began, forcing native Irish off their land to make way for colonists from 
Great Britain (Ellis, 1975). Prior to James’ rule colonists tended to assimilate with 
the Irish, rather than forcibly remove them. In 1641, amidst the schism between 
Charles I and Parliament, the Irish rebelled to re-claim the land taken from them 
by colonists (Ellis, 1975). The Irish clans formed the Irish Catholic Confederacy 
in 1642, which recognized the king as head of state but supported measures to end 
Ireland’s subservient position to Britain. However, the Confederacy was unable to 
reach an agreement with Charles before he was captured in 1648 and the 
Parliamentary forces vowed to crush the Irish Confederacy (Ellis, 1975). Oliver 
Cromwell led a brutal invasion of Ireland, slaughtering whole villages and 
hunting down Catholic priests. In 1652 Charles Fleetwood, the Commander-in-
Chief of Ireland, ordered all Irish to move the far west province of Connaught or 
County Clare in the southwest under pain of death. In January 1653, Catholicism 
was banned in Ireland and in April of that year the last Irish garrison surrendered 
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to Cromwell’s forces. Irish land was distributed to soldiers leaving Cromwell’s 
army, while thousands of Irish were forcibly deported to British plantations in 
Barbados (Ellis 1975). The British constructed a series of forts around Connaught 
and Clare to keep those Irish who remained inside. Cromwell died in 1658 and the 
monarchy was restored in 1660, but the plight of the Irish was just beginning.  
 The penal laws, which discriminated against the Irish Catholic population, 
took full effect under William and Mary. These laws, including the ban of 
Catholics from political participation, remained an issue of contention in Ireland 
well into the 19th Century. In May 1798, inspired by the French Revolution, 
Wolfe Tone led an uprising of the United Irishmen against British rule. The 
British successfully arrested several of the United Irishmen’s leaders prior to the 
revolt and the French aid they were relying on did not arrive (Beckett, 1966). The 
revolt failed quickly across Ireland and when the French did arrive in August, 
they experienced brief success before capitulating to British forces. Tone was 
captured and found guilty of high treason, but committed suicide in prison before 
his execution. Tone strove for an independent Ireland, but he failed to rally the 
Irish people to his cause and was ultimately defeated by his lack of support. 
However, he would be glorified by future generations when the fight for Irish 
independence finally came to fruition (Beckett, 1966). After the failure of Tone’s 
rebellion, the British took advantage of Irish vulnerability and passed legislation 
bringing Ireland into political union with Great Britain. The Act of Union took 




 The political leadership of Daniel O’Connell, the Great Famine, and the 
Home Rule movement led by Charles Steward Parnell were the key Irish events 
of the 19th Century. During the first thirty odd years of the Union, there was very 
little nationalist activity in Ireland. Catholic Emancipation was the only issue to 
produce significant unity among the Irish population. Daniel O’Connell emerged 
as the leader of the movement, founding the Catholic Association in May 1823, 
which promoted rights for Catholics and worked to defend and forward their 
interests in all aspects of life (Beckett, 1966). O’Connell successfully rallied 
widespread support by lowering the membership fee for the Association to one 
penny a month, allowing the Catholic poor (the majority of Catholics at the time) 
to join. With overwhelming support in the Catholic community, though many 
could not vote because they were not property-owners, Emancipation candidates 
stood for the Westminster election in 1826. O’Connell ran for a seat in county 
Clare in 1828 and won easily (Beckett, 1966). With the pressure mounting, the 
government passed the Emancipation Act in 1829, allowing members of all 
Christian faiths to sit in Parliament. O’Connell became the first Roman Catholic 
to sit in Parliament, while simultaneously improving the lives of Catholics 
throughout the United Kingdom. After achieving emancipation, O’Connell spent 
much of his long career fighting for the repeal of the Union between Ireland and 
Great Britain. During the push for repeal, O’Connell came into conflict with the 
“Young Ireland” movement, romantic nationalists that clashed with O’Connell’s 
pragmatism and willingness to compromise. Young Ireland would suffer from 
their clashes with O’Connell and faded into obscurity by the 1850s, however their 
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spirit would live on to inspire the militant nationalists of the 1916 Easter Rising 
(Beckett, 1966). O’Connell’s push for repeal never came to fruition, with the 
Union still firmly in place at the time of his death in 1847. O’Connell will forever 
be renowned in Irish history for effectively using the power of mass opinion, 
teaching the Catholic majority to regard itself as the Irish nation, and building a 
foundation for the future push for Irish independence (Beckett, 1966).  
 In 1846, the potato blight hit Ireland with tremendous force, causing a 
total crop failure. Four million people faced starvation, yet the government did 
little to prevent the devastation. Although, in theory, Ireland was part of the 
United Kingdom, most politicians viewed it as a separate entity and refused to 
offer significant aid (Beckett, 1966). However, by January 1847, the government 
realized they had to act and set up programs that were feeding three million 
people daily by August. Accompanying the famine was disease and emigration. 
With little available land, non-eldest children emigrated en mass, while disease 
ravaged many of those who stayed behind. In the end, approximately one million 
people would die due to effects of the famine and Ireland’s population would be 
in continuous decline for the rest of the 19th Century (Beckett, 1966). The Great 
Famine, besides its physical impact, forged a new bitterness among the Irish 
towards the entire political system, for the British government exported grain and 
beef from Ireland throughout the famine, while hundreds of thousands died of 
starvation. This bitterness was particularly strong amongst the Irish diaspora, who 
would subsequently provide financial backing for Irish nationalists throughout the 
19th and 20th Centuries. 
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 The Home Rule movement rose to prominence in the late 1860s under the 
leadership of Isaac Butt. Butt helped found the Home Government Association 
(changed to Home Rule League in 1873) in 1870 and would lead the Home Rule 
Party at Westminster after they won a surprising 59 seats in 1874 (Beckett, 1966). 
The Home Rule party advocated the devolution of powers to the Irish people and 
the repeal of the Act of Union of 1800 that united Ireland with Great Britain, but 
supported the British monarch as head of state. Butt’s conservative nature and 
willingness to work with the government caused a decline in his popularity. 
Charles Stewart Parnell rose to prominence at his expense. Parnell used 
obstructionist tactics in Parliament. He attempted to prevent the government from 
functioning until it addressed the Irish issue. These tactics were overwhelmingly 
popular. After Butt’s death in 1879, Parnell would quickly assume the party’s 
leadership (Beckett, 1966). After the murder of the Chief Secretary and 
Undersecretary for Ireland in Dublin by radical Irish nationalists, Parnell briefly 
retired from politics in 1882 and openly condemned the murderers in his last 
parliamentary session. His brief respite greatly raised his prestige in both Britain 
and Ireland and after he was convinced to return to political life, he commanded 
greater popular support than before (Beckett, 1966). Despite the efforts of Parnell 
and William Gladstone, the Liberal Party leader, a Home Rule bill was defeated 
by a combination of the Conservatives and Liberal dissenters in the summer of 
1886. By 1890, Home Rule seemed inevitable, with Parnell’s popularity 
continually on the rise. However, the Home Rule effort collapsed after Parnell 
was caught up in a scandal involving the wife of one of his subordinates. Both the 
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Liberals and his party called for his resignation, but he refused and started a 
vigorous campaign across Ireland. Parnell overworked himself and collapsed in 
October 1891. He died a few days later, at age 45. The Home Rule party 
disintegrated soon afterwards opening the way for more radical, militant 
nationalists, who remembered Parnell not for his career in Parliament but his last 
campaign, when he turned his back on the British political system (Beckett, 
1966).  
 For the next 15 years Parliament continued to debate Home Rule, but 
failed to pass a bill prior to the start of the First World War. During this period 
militant organizations began forming in the Protestant dominated Ulster region. 
The Protestants of the Ulster province adamantly opposed the Home Rule 
movement and prepared to fight to defend the Union. In response, nationalist 
groups began to arm themselves and tensions almost broke into civil war, but the 
start of World War 1 pushed the Home Rule decision off the government’s 
agenda (Beckett, 1966). Militant nationalists saw the war as an opportunity to free 
Ireland from a distracted British government. The insurrection took place on 
Easter Monday, 1916 in Dublin. It lasted less than a week and the British Army 
arrested, court martialed, found guilty and executed its leaders. Prior to the 
executions, there was very little support for the rebellion; however, the leaders 
quickly became martyrs in the eyes of most Irish, creating a resurgence of 
opposition to the government (Beckett, 1966). In December 1919, the recently 
elected Irish Members of Parliament met in Dublin and declared an Irish 
Republic. Soon, a full-scale guerilla war broke out between the newly formed 
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Irish Republican Army and the Royal Irish Constabulary, composed of mainly ex-
army officers. The conflict was extremely brutal. Both sides lacked discipline and 
used terror tactics. By July 1921, Prime Minister Lloyd George convinced Eamon 
de Valera, the leader of the rebellion, to meet and discuss peace. The talks 
continued through December, but de Valera left in October, leaving the 
discussions to subordinates. Lloyd George successfully pressures the Irish 
delegation to sign a treaty on 6 December 1921, which established the Irish Free 
State, a self-governing dominion within the British Empire (Beckett, 1966). Six 
counties of the province of Ulster were excluded from the agreement, reflecting 
their desire to remain part of the United Kingdom. After intense debate, the Irish 
parliament approved the treaty by a slim margin. The opposition, led by de 
Valera, rearmed and a civil war broke out between the new forces of the Irish Free 
State and their former comrades who opposed the treaty. The Irish Constitution 
came into force in December 1922, officially transferring power to Dublin. The 
six counties of Ulster executed their ability to opt out of the Irish Free State, 
creating the self-ruling Northern Ireland and a division that continues today. In 
May 1923, de Valera called for a ceasefire, ending the civil war (Beckett, 1966). 
For the next 50 years, the Protestant-controlled Parliament of Northern Ireland ran 
the country, until the Troubles broke out in the late 1960s. The British 






Background and Comparison of the Three Agreements 
The Sunningdale Agreement emerged from the turmoil of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. Following the introduction of the Civil Rights movement in 
1968, violent clashes took place between protestors and police. In an early attempt 
to quell the violence, the British political parties, Conservative and Labour, 
agreed to form a bipartisan policy towards Northern Ireland, stressing the 
promotion of ‘moderate’ forces (Dixon, 2008). The two parties also contemplated 
radical action, including a united Ireland as a solution to the increasing violence, 
but agreed that it could only happen with the consent of the people (Dixon, 2008). 
After it quickly became evident that government reforms were failing and 
violence was still on the rise, the British government deployed the army to 
maintain order. The army’s presence produced an escalation in violence, 
particularly after they began patrolling nationalist neighborhoods (Dixon, 2008). 
In August 1971, the government implemented an internment policy, permitting 
the arrest and indefinite internment of anyone suspected of association with 
paramilitary groups (Dixon, 2008). The police used the policy to discriminate 
against nationalists, evident by the fact the first loyalist paramilitary was not 
interned until February 1973 (Dixon, 2008).  
Following the “Bloody Sunday” incident on January 30, 1972, during 
which 13 protestors were shot and killed by British troops, the British government 
dissolved the Northern Ireland government and instituted direct rule from London 
(Dixon, 2008). The government faced a number of new challenges at this time, 
including: the rise in political standing of loyalist extremists like Ian Paisley, the 
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leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP); a radicalization of the nationalist 
community; a resurgence of Irish Republican Army (IRA) violence and a 
continuation of loyalist violence; and a worsening of relations between 
nationalists and the British army (Wolff, 2001). The initial peace process began 
shortly after the implementation of direct rule, when the British government 
entered into secret talks with the IRA; however, the IRA was convinced that 1972 
was the ‘year of victory’ and little came from the talks (Dixon, 2008). The 
government went ahead with the peace process, publishing a White Paper, 
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, in March 1973 acknowledging the 
Republic of Ireland’s legitimate interest in the affairs of Northern Ireland and 
laying the groundwork for a new Northern Ireland Assembly, with plans for 
elections in June 1973 (Dixon, 2008). The election results demonstrated that the 
government’s promotion of the moderates failed, with the majority of the votes 
split between pro-White Paper and anti-White Paper unionists and the newly 
emerged nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)2 (Dixon, 2008). 
The Sunningdale talks took place December 6 through December 9, 1973, 
to decide the nature of the Irish Republic’s role in Northern Ireland and to 
establish the political structure of the power-sharing executive (Dixon, 2008). The 
talks concluded in an agreement to establish a Northern Irish Assembly, with the 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Alliance Party forming a coalition and serving as 
the first power-sharing executive (Wolff, 2001). The Alliance Party is the only 
party in Northern Ireland that attracts significant cross-community support. They 
denounce the sectarian politics, refuse to designate themselves as nationalist or 
                                                 
2
 See Appendix 3 for graph of the 1973 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 
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unionist, and believe there can be no constitutional change without the consent of 
the people (Dixon, 2008). The Alliance Party has had limited success at the polls, 
never attaining greater than 20 percent of the vote. Much of the party’s support 
comes from the middle class and its principal electoral rivals have been the SDLP 
and UUP (Dixon, 2008). The Alliance Party also represents business interests; 
part of the reason they advocated the cessation of the violence was it hurt 
Northern Ireland’s business development. The agreement went into effect on 
January 1, 1974, but was quickly undermined by a vote to reject the agreement by 
the governing body of the UUP, the Ulster Unionist Council (UUC) (Dixon, 
2008). Reaction to the agreement reflected the sectarian divide, with nationalists 
generally in favor and unionists opposed. Unionist opposition continued to grow 
throughout the early months of 1974, ultimately bringing down the power-sharing 
executive in May, when the Ulster Worker’s Council (UWC) called for a general 
strike that lasted 14 days paralyzing Northern Ireland. The executive possessed 
little power to put down the strike, forcing the British government to reinstate 
direct rule, officially ending the power-sharing experiment.  
The Anglo-Irish Agreement developed in the early 1980s when the 
Conservatives, now securely in power in the British Parliament, saw an 
opportunity to halt the rising influence of Sinn Féín and increase political 
stability. After the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement, formal discussion 
about power-sharing halted until 1979. In the 1979 general election, the 
Conservatives won a large majority in the British Parliament, ending the need to 
gain the support of the UUP at Westminster and allowing power-sharing talks to 
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start again (Dixon, 2008). The new Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, started the 
Atkins Initiative shortly after the election, which promoted power-sharing and 
devolution in Northern Ireland; the talks also considered an Irish dimension, 
which was subsequently promoted through the Anglo-Irish process from 1980 
onwards (Dixon, 2008). The Atkins Initiative collapsed in November 1980, but 
the following month Thatcher led a delegation of British politicians to Dublin for 
an Anglo-Irish summit. Thatcher sought to improve the security situation and 
cross-border cooperation between the two states in the fight against terrorism and 
she publically acknowledged the Republic’s interest in Northern Ireland. The 
rapid growth of support for Sinn Féin in the north scared the Irish government 
because if the support spread to the Republic it had the potential to undermine 
their authority. To halt Sinn Féin’s advance and demonstrate the advantages of 
constitutional nationalism the Irish government participated in the talks. The 
central idea behind the Anglo-Irish Agreement was a firm and official recognition 
of the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland by the Irish government 
as a foundation from which they could be given systematic and institutionalized 
influence on British decision-making without compromising British sovereignty 
(Dixon, 2008).  
The governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland 
signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement on November 15, 1985. It formally established 
inter-state cooperation, was a formal notice to the unionist community that the 
consent policy remained intact, but they had no veto over policy in Northern 
Ireland, and formalized the strategy to bind the Republic to a constitutional mode 
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of reunification (O’Leary, 2004a). The AIA also established the British-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference, to meet regularly, in which the Republic’s 
delegation would represent and advocate the positions of the nationalists in the 
north (Dixon, 2008). This served as an official channel for the nationalists to 
negotiate with the British government. Like the Sunningdale Agreement, reaction 
to the AIA was generally positive among nationalists and negative among 
unionists. The republicans condemned the AIA because the increased security 
measures meant to destroy the IRA, but the nationalist community at large 
welcomed it, especially since the SDLP played a leading role in its creation 
(Dixon, 2008). Unionist reaction was extremely negative for three main reasons: 
(1) the AIA did not define the “current status” of Northern Ireland as part of the 
United Kingdom; (2) it discouraged the SDLP from engaging in power-sharing 
because all their demands were met; (3) and the unionists were not consulted by 
the British government prior to the signing of the AIA (Dixon, 2008). The 
Unionist MPs, in protest of the AIA, resigned their seats at Westminster, forcing a 
by-election for the Northern Irish seats in the U.K. Parliament. The election 
would indirectly be a referendum on the AIA; anti-AIA candidates received 43 
percent of the vote (Dixon, 2008).  
By February 1986, the leaders of the UUP and DUP were in talks with 
Thatcher over the AIA. The leaders agreed to contemplate devolution if Thatcher 
suspended the AIA and reached an understanding that the government would 
consult them in the future about policies in Northern Ireland. However, after 
returning home, radical supporters of the UUP and DUP forced the leaders to 
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retreat and proclaim an end of discussions with Thatcher until the destruction of 
the AIA (Dixon, 2008). The unionist leaders struggled to maintain order and riots 
broke out in the spring of 1986; this backtracking revealed the immense 
constraints under which unionist politicians were operating (Dixon, 2008). A 
1989 review of the AIA reported ‘disappointing progress’, with no marked 
improvement in general security or intercommunal relations (Dixon, 2008). 
 The origins of the Good Friday Agreement date back to the late 1980s 
when Sinn Féin and the SDLP started engaging in secret talks to outline the 
nationalist and republican views of the ‘road to peace’ (Wolff, 2001). By 1993, 
after five years of secret talks with the SDLP, it appeared republicans were on the 
verge of giving the non-violent path a chance. The IRA declared a “complete 
cessation of all military activities” on August 31, 1994, which was quickly 
recognized by the Irish government as legitimate. Within days, the leaders of the 
Irish government and the SDLP formally welcomed Gerry Adams (leader of Sinn 
Féin) into the ‘pan-nationalist’ movement with a three-way handshake in Dublin 
(Dixon, 2008). Former U.S. Senator and Majority Leader George Mitchell, who 
would act as one of three moderators during all-party talks, published a report on 
decommissioning in January 1996, recognizing that the paramilitaries would not 
decommission prior to all-party talks, but must make a clear commitment to do so 
once talks began. Decommissioning or disarmament of paramilitary weapons was 
a crucial talking point of the peace talks. The most contentious topic after the 
signing of the GFA was when paramilitary groups had to demonstrate their 
commitment to decommissioning. The Independent International Commission on 
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Decommissioning, chaired by Canadian General John de Chastelain, was created 
to assist the signees of the GFA in the disarmament of all paramilitary 
organizations (O’Leary, 2004b). I will discuss the conflict over the deadline for 
decommissioning in greater detail later in the paper. Committing to the ‘Mitchell 
Principles’ of democracy and non-violence became an essential first step for a 
party to enter the formal peace process (Dixon, 2008). The ‘Mitchell Principles’ 
emerged in early 1996 International Body of Decommissioning first began 
meeting. The body was composed of former U.S. Senator and Majority Leader 
George Mitchell, John de Chastelain, the retiring chief of the Canadian Defense 
Forces, and Harri Holkeri, the former prime minister of Finland (Mitchell, 2001). 
The body formulated the principles of democracy and nonviolence (later coined 
as the ‘Mitchell Principles’), to which any party wanting to enter negotiations 
would have to commit itself (Mitchell, 2001).  This step barred Sinn Féin from 
entering the talks after the IRA ended its ceasefire on February 9, 1996, setting off 
a bomb in London, accusing the British government of intransigence. All-party 
talks began in June 1996; since the IRA failed to resume its ceasefire, the talks 
started without Sinn Féin (Dixon, 2008). 
The entire peace process changed on May 1, 1997 when Tony Blair and 
the Labour Party won an enormous majority in the British House of Commons. 
Blair brought a dynamic team into office with him, committed to securing peace 
in Northern Ireland. Shortly after taking over as Prime Minister, Blair made a 
speech directed at Sinn Féin in which he made clear that the “settlement train was 
leaving” and it was not going to wait for them (Mitchell, 2001). The republicans 
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took Blair’s message to heart and on July 20, 1997, the IRA restored its ceasefire. 
Shortly after, Sinn Féin signed the ‘Mitchell Principles’ and was allowed to enter 
the all-party talks, causing a walk-out by the DUP and the UK Unionist Party 
(UKUP), a small, unionist party that championed direct rule (Wolff, 2001). Blair 
then had to focus his efforts on the UUP and its leader David Trimble. Hard-line 
unionists, like Paisley, put Trimble under extreme pressure not to sit with Sinn 
Féin. However, without the UUP, the peace talks could not progress. In what 
many commentators agreed was a brave gamble, Trimble returned to the talks in 
mid-September 1997, leading the UUP in talks with Sinn Féin for the first time in 
75 years (Dixon, 2008). The talks continued through April 10, 1998, when eight 
Northern Irish political parties and the governments of the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland signed the GFA (Wolff, 2001).The nationalist community 
embraced the GFA, with a few exceptions from radical republican groups. The 
unionist community was split over the GFA. However, most unionists fell into the 
pro-agreement camp. The people of Ireland, north and south, voted to approve the 
GFA in referenda in May, with 71.1 percent in favor in the north and 94 percent 
in favor in the south (Dixon, 2008). Although there have been significant 
setbacks, the GFA still holds today and Northern Ireland is enjoying relative 
peace for the first time in thirty years.  
 Moving from the background and reception of each agreement, I will now 
present a comparison of the three settlements. The three agreements have 
numerous similarities, illustrating the consistent nature of the issues over thirty 
years of conflict.  The desired outcome for the AIA was not the same as 
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Sunningdale and the GFA. The AIA was widely conceived as a stepping-stone or 
first step towards peace, not a full-fledged peace settlement (Dixon, 2008).  
However, all three agreements share sections related to Northern Ireland’s future. 
For example, the principle of the consent of the majority in regards to all 
constitutional changes in Northern Ireland is a consistent aspect of all the 
agreements, reassuring the unionist community of its firm place in the United 
Kingdom (Wolff, 2001). All three agreements also included an institutional role 
for the Republic of Ireland. Recognizing the ‘Irish Dimension’ was an essential 
step to persuading the nationalists to participate in the discussions; by including 
the Irish government in the deliberations and continually working with the Irish 
outside the talks, the British government ensured the presence of at least part of 
the nationalist community during the creation of all three agreements.  
An important piece of the agreements, particularly the AIA, is security 
cooperation along the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland. 
Successive British governments wanted the Republic’s help in stopping the IRA 
from moving men, arms, and supplies between the two states, believing this 
would severely undermine their base of operations and dramatically decrease 
violence in the North (Dixon, 2008). The Sunningdale Agreement and the GFA 
share additional similarities because the end goal of both agreements was peace 
based on the creation of a power-sharing body and an Irish dimension (Dixon, 
2008). These additional similarities include reforming the police system, creating 
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, steps to release political prisoners, 
commitments to abandon violence, and devolution of powers to a Northern Irish 
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government body (Wolff, 2001). The three agreements clearly share several 
commonalities, yet only the GFA succeeded. To help explain this, I will next 
examine important differences between the agreements.  
 The desired outcome of the AIA compared with Sunningdale and the GFA 
is a fundamental difference that distinguishes it from the other two. The British 
and Irish governments signed the AIA to undermine support for Sinn Féin, 
improve security cooperation in the fight against the IRA, and take a step towards 
a lasting peace (Dixon, 2008). Certainly, the AIA contained many features similar 
to the other two agreements, but the fundamental idea behind it differs. 
Contrasting certain elements of Sunningdale and the GFA, such as the creation of 
a Northern Ireland Assembly, with the AIA is not possible because they were not 
discussed during the deliberations for the AIA.  
A key difference relevant to all the agreements is the actors who signed 
them. The first two agreements did not include key actors from the conflict in the 
negotiations, strongly contributing to both ending in failure. Five groups took part 
in designing the Sunningdale Agreement, the governments of the UK and Ireland, 
the UUP, SDLP, and the Alliance Party (Wolff, 2001). The British government 
did invite the IRA to participate in the talks, however, they refused to do so 
because of a strong belief in the early to mid 1970s that victory was imminent and 
participating would only hinder it (Dixon, 2008). The radical loyalist parties, 
despite their recent surge in the polls, were not invited to participate for fear they 
would disrupt the negotiations (Dixon, 2008). Without IRA and loyalist 
participation no agreement could guarantee a lasting peace.  
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The British government excluded all unionists, including moderates, and 
Sinn Féin from participating in the AIA talks. Technically the SDLP did not 
participate because the discussion was between the British and Irish governments, 
however the Irish government stayed in constant communication with the SDLP 
throughout the process (Dixon, 2008). The British excluded the unionists because 
of their staunch opposition to the Republic of Ireland having influence on the 
internal affairs of Northern Ireland. The government felt they would refuse to 
reach an agreement and disrupt the negotiations. Thatcher’s Cabinet was very 
skeptical about the authenticity of the unionists’ ‘moderation’ policies and 
believed they would misinterpret an improvement in security as a design for 
unification (Dixon, 2008). The governments barred Sinn Féin from participating 
because they were the force the governments were attempting to undermine by 
signing the AIA. Without the inclusion of the unionists, their reaction was 
predictably negative. The AIA gained approval from the nationalists, but winning 
over the unionists was half the battle. Their support would be necessary in order 
for any agreement to experience success. 
 Learning from the failures of the previous agreements, the governments 
did not exclude any party from participating in the GFA deliberations, so long as 
they signed and adhered to the ‘Mitchell Principles’ (Dixon, 2008). The inclusion 
of Sinn Féin led to the voluntary exclusion by the DUP and the UKUP. However, 
the final tally of actors that signed the GFA included both governments; the UUP; 
the SDLP; two political wings of loyalist paramilitary groups the Ulster 
Democratic Party (UDP) and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP); the Northern 
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Ireland Women’s Coalition, a pro-peace party with no allegiance to either side; 
the Northern Ireland Labour Party; the Alliance Party; and Sinn Féin (Wolff, 
2001).  A larger range of political actors, compared to the previous agreements, 
signed the GFA, contributing strongly to its wider acceptance in the nationalist 
and unionist communities. It has thus far produced a fairly stable peace 
throughout Northern Ireland for the past 14 years.  
 Another key difference between the agreements is the maintenance or 
removal of Articles II and III of the Irish Constitution. The constitution came into 
force in December of 1937 and can only be amended by referendum. Prior to 
1999, when the Irish people voted to amend Articles II and III as a condition of 
the GFA, Article II claimed that the island of Ireland formed a single national 
territory and Article III asserted the right of the Irish judiciary to exercise 
jurisdiction over the whole of the island (Dixon, 2008). These claims outraged the 
unionist community, reinforcing their fear of a united Ireland. A fundamental 
reason why Sunningdale and the AIA failed was the Irish Republic’s refusal to 
amend the two articles. This provoked unionist opposition and subsequently led to 
the collapse of both agreements. The Irish agreed to amend the two articles as a 
condition of the GFA, helping to prevent a repeat of unionist opposition from the 
previous settlements (Dixon, 2008). 
 When examining Sunningdale and the GFA alone, it is evident that a 
number of disparities exist between the two peace processes, helping to explain 
the failure of the former and success of the latter. One key attribute in the GFA 
not featured in Sunningdale is the development of an ‘East-West’ relationship 
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between the UK and Ireland to promote “the totality of relationships among the 
peoples of these islands” (Dixon, 2008, p 266). This inter-island cooperation was 
an essential contribution to the peace process, with both sides hoping that it would 
help maintain the peace well into the future. The GFA also promotes a more 
dynamic and fair Executive for the Northern Ireland Assembly; the d’Hondt 
method of forming the Executive gives parties with adequate support a guarantee 
of some Executive power if they decide to take it (Dixon, 2008). The d’Hondt 
method, named after Belgian Viktor d’Hondt, is a proportional technique for 
allotting offices to parties according to the number of seats they hold in the 
legislature. The method employs a simple series of divisors, 1, 2, 3, etc. The party 
with the largest number of seats gets its pick of the ministries available, and then 
its seat share is divided by two. The party with the next highest number of seats 
gets the next ministry, and so on (O’Leary, 2004b). The Sunningdale Agreement 
allowed for the complete exclusion of republicans from the power-sharing 
Executive, whereas the GFA ensures that republicans will have a share of the 
power (Dixon, 2008). This dynamic Executive prevented any possible 
discriminatory or prejudice legislation from passing, common practice under the 
unionist controlled Parliament of Northern Ireland prior to the imposition of direct 
rule in 1972. The GFA also implemented complex voting procedures for the 
newly created, unicameral, 108-seat Northern Ireland Assembly. The voting 
procedures grant virtual veto rights to both communities (Wolff, 2001). To further 
assure the unionist community that no decision can be made without their 
consent, the GFA stipulates that all decisions taken by the North-South 
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Ministerial Council are subject to the approval of both the Irish government and 
the Northern Ireland Assembly (Wolff, 2001). After comparing the Sunningdale 
Agreement with the GFA, it is clear that the GFA is a far more sophisticated 
document. The GFA has remained in place for almost 14 years, while the 
Sunningdale Agreement fell apart in less than six months.  The prolonged 
existence and wide acceptance of the GFA in both Northern Ireland and the Irish 
Republic superbly illustrates the improvements made in the second agreement.  
 
The Three Agreements through the Lens of the Contentious Politics 
Thesis 
 Examining the three agreements through the lens of the contentious 
politics thesis enhances our understanding of how each agreement came into 
being and why the GFA was the only one to succeed. Identifying the mechanisms 
and processes present in the buildup and aftermath of each agreement allows us to 
study interactions among various elements involved in an episode of contention 
and how the mechanisms and processes altered previously established 
connections (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Let us first examine the 
Sunningdale Agreement to identify the causal mechanisms and processes present 
during the events before and after the signing of the agreement.  
Sunningdale Agreement 
 Several causal mechanisms and processes are recognizable in the build-up 
and aftermath of the Sunningdale Agreement. Category formation is evident 
during the 1968 civil rights marches. According to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
(2001) category formation creates identities by means of three different sub-
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mechanisms, through invention, borrowing, and encounter. The Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association (NICRA) borrowed the identity of civil rights 
movements active in the United States and the United Kingdom. The original 
sentiment of the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was to create a united 
Protestant and Catholic working class to confront the discriminatory Parliament of 
Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008). The movement originated under socialist 
leadership hoping to secure equal rights for Catholics; however, an identity shift 
occurred in January 1969 after the student group People’s Democracy defied a 
NICRA moratorium and organized a march from Belfast to Derry (Dixon, 2008). 
Identity shift is the formation of new identities within challenging groups (Tarrow 
& Tilly, 2007). The march indicated a shift in focus by the marchers. Their 
attention and the purpose of the marches moved from raising awareness about 
civil rights to raising awareness about the state security apparatus and sectarian 
divisions. Marches continued throughout the spring of 1969, most ending in riots 
between protestors and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Derry, in 
particular, was home to numerous clashes between police and marchers, leading 
to the ‘Free Derry’ movement, which attempted, using local vigilantes and 
barricades, to keep the RUC out of nationalist neighborhoods (Tarrow & Tilly, 
2007). According to Niall Ó Dochartaigh (1997), by Easter 1969 “there had been 
a distinct resurgence of basic nationalist feeling in Derry” (p. 45) 
To deter the increasing violence and rise in nationalism, the British 
government deployed the army to Northern Ireland August 14, 1969. The army’s 
policies became increasingly oppressive when the Edward Heath-led 
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Conservative Party won the U.K. parliamentary election in June 1970. Shortly 
after the Conservative victory, one can identify the mechanisms of repression and 
boundary activation, notably during the Falls Road Curfew, from July 3-5 1970. 
Boundary activation is the creation of a new boundary or crystallization of an 
existing one between challenging factions and their targets (Tarrow & Tilly, 
2007). The army imposed the curfew on the predominantly nationalist Falls Road 
neighborhood to search homes for arms and arrest suspected paramilitary 
members. Enforcing the curfew distinctly on a nationalist neighborhood 
entrenched the notion that the Falls Road was home to only nationalists and 
indicated a clear dividing line between the two opposing communities. By the end 
of the curfew, five people died and over 60 were injured, but repression can be 
identified well after that. The implementation of an internment policy in August 
1971 allowed police to arrest and intern anyone suspected of paramilitary activity 
for an indefinite amount of time without trial (BBC News, 1971). The policy 
targeted only the nationalist community.  
This police discrimination, along with the memories of the Falls Road 
Curfew, leads us to two new identifiable processes that emerged at the time. The 
first process is upward scale shift, defined as the change in the number and level 
of coordinated contentious actions leading to broader contention involving a 
wider range of actors and bridging claims and identities (McAdam et al., 2001). 
This occurred after the Falls Road Curfew when the IRA deemed previously 
excluded British soldiers as acceptable targets for IRA violence (Dixon, 2008). 
The IRA’s change in policy brought the violence in Northern Ireland to the homes 
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of many families throughout Britain and marked the beginning of a guerilla war 
against the army.  
The other process is polarization. After the curfew and internment, the 
nationalist community felt alienated by the security forces, particularly the army. 
The purpose of the initial army deployment was to maintain peace. However, after 
soldiers began patrolling nationalist neighborhoods, the Falls Road Curfew, and 
the implementation of internment, nationalists firmly believed the impartiality of 
the army was over (Dixon, 2008). Exemplifying this polarization is the 
acceleration in IRA recruitment and the growing support for extreme unionists, 
like Ian Paisley. The animosity towards the army increased in the nationalist 
community after ‘Bloody Sunday’, when British soldiers shot and killed thirteen 
unarmed Catholic civilians in Derry. Shortly afterwards, Prime Minister Edward 
Heath demanded the transfer of security powers to Westminster, forcing the 
British government to impose direct rule on Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008). The 
IRA renewed its violent campaign following the imposition of direct rule. 
Combined with ‘Bloody Sunday’, internment, and the Falls Road Curfew, direct 
rule increased IRA recruitment and strengthened its resolve to rid Northern 
Ireland of the British. The repressive activities of the security forces created an 
opportunity spiral in which the IRA resumed its ‘armed struggle’ against the 
British ‘occupation’ of Northern Ireland. The IRA thoroughly believed they were 
on the verge of victory, especially after the imposition of direct rule, regularly 
declaring every year from 1972 to 1977 the “Year of Victory” (Dixon, 2008). 
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This firm belief resulted in the refusal of the IRA to participate in the Sunningdale 
peace process.  
Following direct rule right through to the Sunningdale Agreement, the 
British government focused most of its effort on bolstering the prestige of 
moderates in Northern Ireland. This attempted convergence, the coming together 
of moderate groups of conflicting viewpoints in opposition to the radicals of both 
sides (McAdam et al., 2001), emphasized the government’s hope that the ‘silent 
majority’ were far more moderate than the politicians who represented them 
(Dixon, 2008). The government hoped to alienate extremists on both sides and 
recruit the general population into the ‘moderate’ UUP, SDLP, and Alliance 
parties. The British wished to use the ‘moderate’ parties to facilitate their desire to 
coerce the Northern Irish electorate towards the middle ground and form a base 
for a power-sharing agreement. In addition to convergence, brokerage between 
the British and Irish governments played a key role in the creation of the 
Sunningdale Agreement. Beginning in 1971, the British began meeting with their 
Irish counterparts, recognizing the Republic’s legitimate interest in the affairs of 
the North (Dixon, 2008). The relationship prospered throughout the early 1970s, 
culminating in Heath’s visit to Dublin in September 1973, the first visit by British 
prime minister since 1921 (Dixon, 2008). The emerging Anglo-Irish relationship 
bolstered the prospects for creating an agreement supported by the nationalists. 
However, it alienated unionists, who were deeply suspicious of British intentions 
(Dixon, 2008). Unionists feared and suspected the government was seeking a 
quick exit from Northern Ireland and the developing relationship with the Irish 
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Republic furthered their suspicions. The emphasis on ‘moderates’ and the revived 
Anglo-Irish relationship created the framework for the Sunningdale talks in 
December 1973 and the eventual implementation of the Sunningdale Agreement 
in January 1974.  
The power-sharing experiment established in the Sunningdale Agreement 
collapsed in May 1974. The various unionist groups that brought down the power-
sharing executive utilized both mechanisms and processes identified in McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly (2001). The anti-Sunningdale unionists displayed object shift, 
the alteration in relations between claimants and objects of claims, when they 
created the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) in December 1973. The 
UUUC brought together numerous factions of unionists, all opposed to 
Sunningdale. The effects of this object shift were felt almost immediately when 
the anti-Sunningdale unionists, running on the UUUC ticket, won a majority of 
seats for Northern Ireland in the British General Election of 19743 (Dixon, 2008). 
Despite the election result, the newly installed Labour government refused to call 
an election for the Northern Ireland Assembly, ignoring a clear message from 
many unionists in Northern Ireland who believed the government was imposing 
the settlement without their consent (Dixon, 2008).  
After the electoral process failed to dismantle the executive, the anti-
Sunningdale unionists turned to the social appropriation process, which is the use 
of existing institutions to progress contentious claims (McAdam et al, 2001). The 
campaign used by the anti-Sunningdale unionists took the form of a general strike 
called by the UWC. The strike, precipitated by the Assembly’s decision to ratify 
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 See Appendix 3 for graph of the 1974 Westminster Elections in Northern Ireland  
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Sunningdale, lasted fourteen days in May 1974. It paralyzed Northern Ireland and 
successfully brought down the power-sharing executive (Dixon, 2008). The 
leaders of the strike were part of a new Protestant working-class. They were not 
affiliated with any loyalist party and generally were suspicious of their political 
representatives. With no organized political base, they appropriated the UWC’s 
network to plan and administer the strike. Loyalist politicians condemned the 
strike and only began supporting it after it became evident it was gaining 
significant popular support (Dixon, 2008). 
 Another mechanism evident in the Sunningdale saga is boundary 
activation. Newly elected Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson demonstrated 
boundary activation in his ‘Spongers Speech’ on May 25, 1974, in which he 
emphasized British nationalist opinion, rallying ‘us’, the ‘British’ people, against 
‘them’, the Northern Irish, whom he accuses of “sponging on Westminster and 
British democracy and then systematically assaulting democratic methods” 
(Dixon, 2001, p. 147). The ‘Spongers Speech’ illustrated an extreme shift in 
Wilson’s position from 1971, when he claimed the Northern Ireland conflict was 
“within our house, within our national family” (Dixon, 2008, p. 147). Wilson’s 
speech was a symbolic end to the first power-sharing experiment. The British 
government resumed direct rule in Northern Ireland shortly thereafter. Studying 
the Sunningdale Agreement through the lens of the contentious politics thesis, it 
becomes clear that a number of causal mechanisms and processes, notably the 
failed development of convergence by the electorate and the object shift by the 
anti-Sunningdale unionists, strongly contributed to the construction and collapse 
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of the agreement. The British government overestimated the appeal of the 
‘moderates’. The object shift by the anti-Sunningdale unionists, when they united 
to bring down the agreement, demonstrates this misinterpretation. 
Anglo-Irish Agreement 
 Moving to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, multiple causal mechanisms and 
processes appear in both the origins and reactions of the agreement. Like 
Sunningdale, they provide further insight into how the agreement came about and 
why it was ineffective. The push to create the AIA began in 1981 shortly after the 
IRA Hunger Strikes. The Hunger Strikes are an example of self-representation, an 
actor’s public display of worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (Tarrow & 
Tilly, 2007). After March 1, 1976, IRA prisoners lost their ‘Special Category’ 
status and received the same treatment as criminals. A variety of IRA prisoner 
protests took place throughout the 1970s to attain ‘political prisoner’ status, 
culminating in the Hunger Strikes in the early 1980s (Dixon, 2008). The second 
Hunger Strike, led by Bobby Sands beginning in March 1981, caused a stir in the 
international community and led to an overwhelming propaganda victory for the 
IRA in the early 1980s. The strikes were a serious blow to the government’s 
efforts to remove the IRA prisoners’ “Special Category” status because regular 
prisoners tend not to kill themselves on hunger strikes (Dixon, 2008). Sands’ 
election to parliament on April 9, 1981 demonstrated a significant base of popular 
support for the IRA and caused the international community to turn its attention to 
the conflict. Sands’ death by starvation on May 5 confirmed the prisoners’ firm 
commitment to the cause.  
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Three processes developed in the aftermath of the hunger strikes. 
International sympathy for the Hunger Strikers alienated the unionists, further 
polarizing the community. This was reflected in the shift of the electorate towards 
Ian Paisley’s hard-line DUP party in local government elections of 1981. The 
DUP narrowly beat the UUP, illustrating the frustration in the unionist community 
over the Hunger Strikes and the more moderate policies of the UUP (Dixon, 
2008). The nationalist community exemplified the increasing polarization in their 
support for Sands, a man the unionists saw as a terrorist. First, the nationalists 
voted him into parliament, and then turned out in the hundreds of thousands to 
attend his funeral (Dixon, 2008). The Hunger Strikes also led to the actor 
constitution, the emergence of a transformed political actor (Tilly and Tarrow, 
2007), in Sinn Féin. Sands won his seat on the Sinn Féin ticket and to maximize 
the support for the Hunger Strikers, at Sinn Féin’s Ard Fheis (conference) 
members voted to contest local elections and to take their seats if they won. The 
party performed well in 1981, electing two candidates to Westminster and two to 
the Dáil.4 They performed even better in 1983, winning 13.4 percent of the vote 
(Dixon, 2008). Sinn Féin’s entrance and success in electoral politics created a 
third process -- competition between itself and the SDLP for the nationalist vote 
and role as the main nationalist party. Competition also developed in the unionist 
community between the DUP and UUP. The DUP made enormous strides in its 
electoral activities. The success of Sinn Féin and the DUP at the ballot box greatly 
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 The Dáil Éireann is the lower house, but principal chamber of the Republic of Ireland’s 
Oireachtas (Parliament).  
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amplified fears that an accommodation between the two communities would 
never develop (Dixon, 2008).  
 The election of a Fine Gael/Labour coalition in Ireland in 1982 and the re-
election of the Conservatives in Britain in 1983 produced an opportunity spiral in 
which an agreement could materialize. The Irish government pushed for an 
initiative in 1983, leading to discussions between officials from each government. 
Although many differences existed between the two governments, they shared a 
growing concern about the threat of Sinn Féin to security and political stability 
(Dixon, 2008). The Irish government’s fear that Sinn Féin’s political success 
would spread and undermine stability in the Republic pressed them into initiating 
talks with the British government. They hoped to improve the security situation 
and demonstrate to nationalists that constitutional politics worked (Dixon, 2008). 
This perceived opportunity by both governments expedited the signing of the AIA 
in November 1985. A series of mechanisms and processes, starting with the self-
representation of the Hunger Strikers, are clearly recognizable in creation of the 
AIA. The Hunger Strikers’ popularity led to Sinn Féin success at the polls, 
causing fear to spread in both Dublin and London, resulting in the signing of the 
AIA to quell Sinn Féin’s advance.  
 The unionist community responded extremely negatively to the AIA, 
organizing a massive collective action movement to protest its implementation. 
The unionists opposed the AIA for three principal reasons. First, it failed to define 
the ‘current status’ of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. Second, 
the AIA represented a complete capitulation to the nationalist agenda and gave the 
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SDLP no incentive to enter a power-sharing administration. Third, the British 
government did not consult the unionists about the AIA (Dixon, 2008). A massive 
anti-AIA demonstration took place on November 23, 1985, involving 250,000 
protestors (a quarter of the unionist population in Northern Ireland). The anti-AIA 
movement continued for several years. A demonstration on its first anniversary 
involved 200,000 people. A petition in January/February 1987 raised 400,000 
signatures (Dixon, 2008). Within a year, the process of escalation, defined by 
Tilly and Tarrow (2007) as “the displacement of moderate goals and tactics by 
more extreme goals and tactics” (p. 216), emerged in the unionist community. 
The unionist leaders met with the British government in February 1986. At the 
end of the meetings, the leaders agreed to consider government proposals and 
discuss devolution if the government suspended the AIA. However, upon 
returning to Belfast, their supporters forced them to retreat from any concessions 
and maintain a firm opposition to the AIA.  
Paisley and Molyneaux encountered the ‘solidary incentive retraction 
problem’ discussed by Duffy and Lindstrom. They use James Wilson’s definition 
of solidary incentives, which is “the promise of relational goods that individuals 
derive from associating with others with whom they identify” (p. 76). The authors 
note a sociological problem with solidary incentives at settlement time. People 
who strongly identify with a group will feel any accommodation to their 
demonized enemy as a personal affront to their well-being. Thus, leaders who 
issue solidary incentives at mobilization time find their actions severely 
constrained when it is time to reach a settlement with their enemy (Duffy & 
36 
 
Lindstrom, 2002). The unionist leaders demonized nationalists and republicans 
for decades and denounced any possibility of a united Ireland. Therefore, any 
conciliatory action towards the nationalists symbolized an attack on unionist well-
being. Thus, when they returned to Belfast after agreeing to consider government 
proposals for settlement the unionist community forced them to retreat. Removing 
the solidary incentives that had been in place for years is a monumental task and 
takes generations to accomplish. These events coincided with a loyalist strike on 
March 3 that led to rioting in which protestors shot at police twenty times and 
injured forty-seven RUC officers (Dixon, 2008). The political leaders struggled to 
regain control of the protests, which James Molyneaux, leader of the UUP, 
acknowledged in April 1986: “the reality is that Mr. Paisley and I…have been 
overtaken by the people of Northern Ireland” (Dixon, 2008, p. 204).  
In the aftermath of the AIA, the polarization of the two communities 
grew. Within the UUP, the majority of members favored further integration into 
the UK against a minority that supported power-sharing, while in the DUP there 
was talk of moving towards independence (Dixon, 2008). On the nationalist side, 
the SDLP turned away from devolution and power-sharing and increasingly 
favored the development of the AIA into joint authority for the Republic. The 
SDLP also began to build common ground with Sinn Féin, opening talks with 
their old rivals in 1988 (Dixon, 2008). Also present in the events following the 
AIA are boundary activation and deactivation. The boundary activation occurred 
when Thatcher reiterated several of the views Wilson expressed in his ‘Sponger’s 
Speech’ about the Northern Irish. A day after the signing of the AIA she referred 
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to herself as an ‘English Nationalist’ in a newspaper interview and many members 
of her cabinet believed she cared far more about the plight of ‘our boys’, meaning 
soldiers from Great Britain, in Northern Ireland than the conflict itself. The Prime 
Minister frequently mentioned the financial drain Northern Ireland was imposing 
on the rest of the UK, often implying that it was a separate entity (Dixon, 2008). 
The boundary deactivation took place in the republican camp after the British 
government ‘faced down’ the unionists to enforce the AIA, undermining 
republican ideology that the unionists were just a tool for British imperialism. 
Republicans, with encouragement from nationalists, began to reconsider whether 
Britain has any selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland (Dixon, 
2008). Certainly, a boundary continued to exist between the British and 
republicans, however the prominence of the ‘us-them’ mentality began to fade. 
By 1989, when a government review of the AIA reported ‘disappointing 
progress’ and  both the nationalist and unionist communities were moving away 
from middle ground, the likelihood of a settlement between the two continued to 
diminish. As with the Sunningdale Agreement, causal mechanisms and processes 
enhance our understanding of the construction and failure of the AIA. Examples 
of these mechanisms and processes include the opportunity spiral in which both 
governments believed creating the agreement would hinder Sinn Féin’s recent 
progress, while simultaneously improving the security cooperation. It also 
includes the substantial collective action movement by unionists in protest of the 
AIA that hampered its effectiveness. These two processes represent both the 
fundamental reasons for the creation and eventual ineffectiveness of the AIA. The 
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contentious politics thesis allows us to single out these key actions as critical 
processes of the AIA. 
Good Friday Agreement 
As in the two agreements discussed above, there are several recognizable 
causal mechanisms and processes in the buildup and aftermath to the Good Friday 
Agreement. They help explain the success of the GFA compared to the failure of 
the previous two. The origins of the GFA date back to 1988, when leaders of Sinn 
Féin and the SDLP entered into dialogue in an attempt to find common ground 
between the republicans and constitutional nationalists (Dixon, 2008). This 
brokerage between Sinn Féin and the SDLP marked major progress for the two 
rivals, who fought for years for the support of the nationalist community. The 
dialogue between the two parties indicated the beginning of an object shift in the 
nationalist community. This would culminate in the three main players, Sinn Féin, 
the SDLP, and the Irish government, working together to create a lasting peace. 
This new ‘pan-nationalist’ front would not complete this object shift until 1997, 
when Sinn Féin formally entered the peace process after signing the ‘Mitchell 
Principles’. The strength of the ‘pan-nationalist’ movement, specifically the 
commitment of Sinn Féin, came under severe scrutiny when the IRA escalated its 
violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed shortly by an escalation of 
loyalist violence. Escalation occurred on the republican side because the IRA 
believed that an act of violence needed to accompany any offer or step towards 
peace to demonstrate clearly that they were not surrendering (Dixon, 2008). The 
loyalist paramilitaries escalated their level of violence because of an increasing 
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feeling of insecurity in the unionist community about their constitutional future. 
Loyalist paramilitary violence increased so dramatically that the paramilitaries 
were killing more people than the IRA (Dixon, 2008). 
Despite the escalation in violence, the ‘pan-nationalist’ movement 
received a boost in support after President Bill Clinton granted Gerry Adams a 
visa to visit the United States on January 30, 1994 to speak at a conference in 
New York (Cockburn & Murdock, 1994). Clinton granted Adams a second visa in 
1995, this time allowing Adams to raise money for Sinn Féin and speak about the 
conflict in Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2008). This act of certification, “an external 
authority’s signal of its readiness to recognize and support the existence and 
claims of a political actor” (Tarrow & Tilly, 2007, p. 215), by Clinton increased 
the legitimacy of Sinn Féin, heightened their support back in Northern Ireland, 
and put pressure on the British government to open all-party talks. After the IRA 
resumed its ceasefire in July 1997, two mechanisms are identifiable -- co-optation 
and defection. Co-optation, “the incorporation of a previously excluded political 
actor into some center of power” (Tarrow & Tilly, 2007, p. 215), occurred after 
Sinn Féin signed the ‘Mitchell Principles’ and entered the peace process in 
September 1997. This differed from previous agreements because for the first 
time the republicans were at the negotiating table. Sinn Féin’s entrance into the 
all-party talks caused the defection of two very different groups from two very 
different coalitions. The first defection took place when the DUP and the UKUP 
left the all-party talks in protest of Sinn Féin’s participation. The second defection 
took place within the republican movement when an IRA splinter group, appalled 
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by Sinn Féin’s signing of the ‘Mitchell Principles’, broke away to form the ‘Real 
IRA’ in the autumn of 1997 (Dixon, 2008). These defections illustrated the 
reluctance of hardliners on both sides of the conflict to enter into discussions with 
their counterparts and reflect a common problem community leaders encounter 
when trying to end a conflict. Burton (1985) refers to this difficulty as the 
“reentry problem.” If leaders agree to settlement terms they must justify any 
community interests that may have been conceded in the negotiations. If leaders 
feel that their constituents will reject the terms of the settlement, they are often 
reluctant to “reenter” their community (Burton 1985). In the case of Northern 
Ireland, leaders from both sides failed to convince all their constituents that the 
GFA was in the best interest of all parties involved. Thus, we see the defection of 
the DUP, UKUP, and the ‘Real IRA’.  
Despite these defections, the peace process carried on and reached an 
agreement on April 10, 1998. On the evening prior to the signing of the GFA, Ian 
Paisley led a few hundred supporters onto the grounds at Stormont, home of the 
old Parliament of Northern Ireland and where the negotiations were taking place. 
Desperate to block the agreement, Paisley refused to disperse the crowd until he 
held a press conference. During the press conference, members of the loyalist 
parties participating in the negotiations, many of whom were once loyal followers 
of the DUP leader, continuously heckled Paisley and accused him of running 
away (Mitchell, 2001). This demonstration of the disillusionment process, “the 
decline in the commitment of individuals or political actors to previously 
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sustaining beliefs” (Tarrow & Tilly, 2007, p. 216), exemplified the predominant 
desire for peace among loyalists. 
 Contrary to the reactions of the previous agreements, nationalists and 
unionists majorities welcomed the GFA. Both were able to argue that it forwarded 
their cause. The GFA returned power and democracy to Northern Ireland, creating 
a Northern Ireland Assembly with legislative and executive powers over matters 
formerly the responsibility of the Northern Ireland departments (Dixon, 2008). An 
identity shift in the Republic of Ireland accompanied the democratization process 
in Northern Ireland. As of December 2, 1999, the Republic formally dropped its 
territorial claim to Northern Ireland; this illustrated the Republic’s firm 
commitment to the peace process, ending a 62-year-old claim that irked unionists.  
Despite the initial positive reaction from majorities on both sides, IRA 
stalling over decommissioning put the future of the GFA into serious doubt. 
Decommissioning or disarmament of paramilitary weapons was a crucial and 
necessary step for the success of the GFA because it demonstrated the IRA’s 
commitment to non-violence. The new Assembly struggled to form an effective 
Executive. This became even more difficult after the 2001 British General 
Election, in which the SDLP lost a number of seats and Sinn Féin became the 
largest national party in the Assembly. This election result, plus new evidence that 
the IRA was still active, fueled unionists’ discontent with the GFA. On July 10, 
2001, the Ulster Freedom Fights and the Ulster Defence Association withdrew 
their support of the GFA (Dixon, 2008). This defection coincided with widespread 
escalation in loyalist violence in 2001-2002 that included 124 loyalist 
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paramilitary shootings and severe rioting in Belfast. Following the events of 
September 11, 2001 the IRA came under severe pressure to begin 
decommissioning. On October 23, 2001 it made its first act of decommissioning. 
This marked a pivotal step in the identity shift of the IRA, the origins of which 
date back to the late 1980s when republican leaders debated the future of the 
‘armed struggle’ (Dixon, 2008). However, in early 2002, evidence that the IRA 
was still training, recruiting, and procuring arms became public. By September, 
UUP ministers threatened to resign if republicans did not demonstrate a 
commitment to peace.  
On October 4, 2002 the ‘Stormontgate’ scandal broke. Police raided Sinn 
Féin offices in Stormont and homes of Sinn Féin officials over allegations that 
republicans were spying on the British and Irish governments. In the aftermath of 
the raids, all the unionist ministers in the Assembly resigned, causing the 
suspension of the power-sharing government (Dixon, 2008). The suspension of 
the Northern Ireland Assembly lasted until May 8, 2007. During the suspension, 
two processes critical to the restoration of devolution are recognizable -- identity 
shift and coalition forming. The identity shift refers to the IRA’s transition from 
the ‘armed struggle’ to a peaceful, democratic political program. The identity shift 
began in 2001 and culminated in the July 28, 2005 IRA declaration that the 
‘armed campaign’ was officially over. The IRA prepared a final act of 
decommissioning (Dixon, 2008). Prior to this, the IRA faced intense scrutiny 
from not only unionists, but many nationalists as well. The organization’s 
criminal activities, including the UK’s largest bank robbery in 2004, discouraged 
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many nationalists, who began to see the IRA as criminal thugs rather than 
freedom fighters (Dixon, 2008).  
With pressure growing within its community to end the violence, the IRA 
finally succumbed, making way for the next process, coalition forming. On 
October 13, 2006, the British and Irish governments announced the ‘St. Andrews 
Agreement’ after talks between the DUP and Sinn Féin in Scotland. The 
agreement set out guidelines that, following an election, would result in the 
participation of Sinn Féin and the DUP in power-sharing devolution (Dixon, 
2008). The election was held in March 2007. They confirmed the dominance of 
Sinn Féin and the DUP. The UUP and SDLP underwent their worst-ever results.5 
On March 26, 2007, Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams met for an hour and appeared 
in public together to endorse the agreement. On May 7, 2007, the British 
government restored devolution to Northern Ireland, and Ian Paisley of the DUP 
and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin were sworn in as First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The two formed a coalition 
between long-time enemies, set on maintaining a lasting peace in Northern Ireland 
(Dixon, 2008).  
 
A Comparative Case Study: The Bosnian War (1992-1995)  
 In this section, I will compare the Bosnian War to the “Troubles” in 
Northern Ireland, illustrating how identifying causal mechanisms and processes 
allows us to draw parallels between two disparate political conflicts. Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Balkans entered a period 
                                                 
5
 See Appendix 3 for graph of the 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections  
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of continuous conflict. Fighting broke out between the former units of 
Yugoslavia, which were divided over whether to remain a single entity. Large-
scale fighting started in 1991 when federal forces of Yugoslavia attempted to 
crush a Slovenian independence movement. The Slovenians were successful and, 
along with Croatia, declared independence on October 8, 1991 (Benson, 2004). 
The following April, communist Yugoslavia officially ceased to exist and a 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed, consisting of Serbia and 
Montenegro. That same month, war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
between ethnic Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims. The signing of the Dayton 
Accords ended the Bosnian War in December 1995 (Benson, 2004).  
 Similarities do exist between the two conflicts. For example, both conflicts 
fall into Tilly and Tarrow’s deadly ethnic and religious conflict category. 
Nonetheless, the differences are more prominent.  While the conflict in Northern 
Ireland centered on whether to remain a part of one state or join another, the 
conflict in Yugoslavia was the outcome of the dissolution of a large federal state, 
with the resulting entities fighting over disputed territory. The war broke out in 
Bosnia because of the contentious composition of its population: Catholic 
Croatians, Islamic Bosnians, and Orthodox Serbians. The Bosnian-Croats and 
Bosnian-Serbs were heavily influenced by their home states (Croatia and Serbia) 
and territorial disputes began, bringing Bosnia to the brink of disintegration. The 
style of fighting and the eventual outcomes of each conflict also differ greatly. 
The fighting in Northern Ireland generally consisted of paramilitary groups using 
clandestine tactics, targeting either the opposing community or the British Army. 
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The fighting in Bosnia was a full-scale war involving three different ethnic 
armies, a United Nations peacekeeping force, and eventually a NATO bombing 
campaign against the Bosnian-Serbs. For the majority of the “Troubles” the 
international community had very little involvement. The U.K. generally dealt 
with the situation in Northern Ireland on its own, collaborating on a significantly 
only with the Republic of Ireland. The first major role of the international 
community in Northern Ireland began in 1996 with the formation of the 
International Body of Decommissioning. In contrast, the international community, 
particularly the United Nations and the European Union, was deeply involved in 
Bosnia from the conflict’s early stages. The most prominent distinctions between 
the “Troubles” and the Bosnian War are their outcomes. The Good Friday 
Agreement established a devolved, power-sharing executive within the U.K. The 
country of Northern Ireland remained in the U.K. and the two warring factions 
have started to work together in the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Dayton 
Accords created a new state, Bosnia and Herzegovina, with two distinct regional 
bodies (Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) based 
on ethnic identity. In Republika Srpska the Bosnian Serbs are the majority, while 
in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Bosnian Muslims are the most 
populous ethnic group. The Dayton Accords also established a federal 
government for the new state, in which all three ethnicities have representation. 
The most important role of the federal government is to serve as a symbol of 
territorial integrity and sovereignty, while keeping the communication lines 
between two regional bodies open (Gow, 1997). The conflicts in Northern Ireland 
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and Bosnia have clear distinctions; however, the contentious politics thesis 
identifies numerous causal mechanisms and processes present in both cases.  
Several causal mechanisms and processes are identifiable in both Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia. The most notable of these include object shift, opportunity 
spirals, democratization, and demobilization. As Tilly and Tarrow point out, these 
causal mechanisms and processes do not always produce the same result because 
of varying regime environments; however, they do allow us to draw parallels 
between disparate forms of contention (2007).   
After the war in Bosnia started in 1992, each ethnic group gathered 
military forces and all three began fighting two-front wars. The Bosnian-Muslims 
suffered the most, losing a large swath of their territory to the Bosnian-Serbs. By 
1994, the Bosnian-Serbs occupied 70 percent of Bosnian territory, while the 
Bosnian-Muslims and Croats continued to fight over the remaining 30 percent 
(Chollet, 2005). The fighting between the Muslims and the Croats broke out when 
Bosnian-Croats declared an independent Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia 
(later “Community” was changed to “Republic”). The Bosnian-Croats intended to 
unite their community with the Republic of Croatia, breaking away from the 
ethnically Muslim Bosnia. This led to clashes between Bosnian-Croat and 
Bosnian-Muslim forces, which lasted from June 1992 to March 1994 (Benson, 
2004). In 1994, the Clinton Administration began lobbying the Bosnian-Muslims 
and the Croats (both the government of Croatia and the Bosnian-Croats) to cease 
fighting and begin working together politically, economically, and most 
importantly militarily to halt the Bosnian-Serbs’ success (Chollet, 2005). By 
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March 1994, the U.S. successfully brokered an agreement (the Washington 
Agreement) between the two sides, forming the Muslim-Croat Federation, which, 
after the war, would control approximately half of Bosnian territory and co-exist 
with a Bosnian-Serb regional entity within a united Bosnian state (Chollet, 2005). 
The implementation of the federation would be settled at Dayton the following 
year and where it was re-named the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 This object shift by both the Bosnian-Muslims and Croatians marked a 
turning point in the Bosnian War. The Croatians favored the object shift because 
they had recently suffered a series of defeats to the Bosnian-Muslims in the winter 
of 1993-4. In addition, they were not strong enough to continue fighting a two-
front war and they wanted to put Croatia in the United States’ diplomatic “good 
book” (Gow, 1997). Uniting with the Bosnian-Muslims allowed them to focus 
their war efforts on the Bosnian-Serbs and raise their standing in the international 
community. The Bosnian-Muslims supported the object shift for similar reasons. 
It allowed them to concentrate all their military efforts on the Bosnian-Serbs and 
outlined a plan for them (along with their new federation partner) to regain 20 
percent of the territory they had lost (Chollot, 2005). The object shift by both the 
Bosnian-Muslims and Croatians increased the level of international support for 
their coalition and was a pivotal step towards ending the war. We can draw a 
parallel to the object shift by the nationalist forces in Northern Ireland that created 
a united nationalist front and led to Sinn Féin entering the peace talks in 1997. In 
both cases, the united groups presented a much stronger front and accelerated the 
peace process. The international support and renewed strength of the Muslim-
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Croat forces leads us to a perceived opportunity spiral by the United States after a 
string of Croatian victories over the Bosnian-Serbs in the spring and summer of 
1995, which caused the Bosnian-Serbs to consider negotiating a peace settlement. 
 In addition to the Croatian victories, three other events helped create the 
opportunity spiral that the Clinton administration used to open negotiations. First 
was the NATO bombing campaign against the Bosnian-Serbs beginning in late 
August 1995. The NATO campaign occurred in response to the Bosnian-Serbs 
firing mortar shells into a busy Sarajevo market place, killing 37 people, and 
wounding 85 others on August 28, 1995 (Chollet, 2005). The shelling indicated to 
the Clinton administration that the Bosnian-Serbs thought the West was capable 
only of empty threats. President Clinton wanted to send a clear message to the 
Bosnian-Serbs that he meant business, telling his staff “We have to hit ‘em hard” 
(Chollet, 2005). The second was the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s 
agreement to speak for the Bosnian-Serbs. This allowed the U.S. to speak to one 
representative, rather than multiple members of the Bosnian-Serb leadership. This 
narrowed the number of parties involved in the negotiations to just two, the 
Muslim-Croat Federation and Serbia (Chollet, 2005). The third and final event 
was the continued work of the lead American negotiator, Richard Holbrooke. His 
resourcefulness and resolve in discussions with the various parties strongly 
contributed to the opportunity for peace the Clinton Administration believed 
existed in the summer of 1995 (Chollet, 2005). The NATO bombing campaign 
and the renewed Croatian offensive severely weakened the Bosnian-Serbs. Under 
Milosevic’s leadership, ending the war became their primary goal. Holbrooke’s 
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negotiating team seized this opportunity and brokered a ceasefire between all 
sides beginning October 11, 1995. In addition to the ceasefire, each side agreed to 
meet in the United States at the end of October for proximity talks, with 
Holbrooke’s negotiating team, with help from the State Department 
representatives, serving as the go-between for the three ethnic groups (Chollet, 
2005).  
The talks convened on November 1, 1995 in Dayton, Ohio. After three 
weeks of negotiations, they produced the Dayton Accords, ending the war in 
Bosnia. Recognizing the opportunity spirals in Northern Ireland and Bosnia 
reveal that, although opportunities existed in both conflicts, they do not 
necessarily result in peace. In Northern Ireland, the opportunity spiral perceived 
by the British and Irish governments produced a political opportunity structure 
that expedited the signing of the AIA, which ultimately failed to cease the 
conflict. However, in Bosnia, the opportunity spiral created by the three events 
discussed above produced a political opportunity structure that accelerated the 
Clinton Administration’s efforts and enhanced their ability to arrange the meeting 
in Dayton, where they would successfully brokered a lasting peace between the 
warring parties.  
 The Dayton Accords also laid the groundwork for the democratization of 
the future Bosnian state. The Dayton Accords dictate that a Parliamentary 
Assembly, a three-person presidency, and a Council of Ministers would all be 
established as part of the Bosnian central government, which has power over the 
two entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. All 
50 
 
three-government bodies have built-in features to prevent discriminatory policies 
being implemented against any of the three ethnic groups. A drawback of this 
policy is that it can hinder the government from functioning effectively, because 
often a consensus is needed for work to proceed (Gow, 1997). The Parliamentary 
Assembly consists of two chambers, the House of Peoples and the House of 
Representatives. The former consists of 15 members, five from each national 
group, appointed from the legislative bodies of the two regional entities. The latter 
chamber has 42 members directly elected from the entities, with two thirds 
coming from the Federation and one third from the Republika Srpska (Gow, 
1997). The Presidency is a three-person body, one from each national group that 
is directly elected from the entities, and serves as the head of state. The chair of 
the Presidency rotates between its three members every eight months. The 
Presidency is responsible for nominating the Council of Ministers, who then must 
be approved by the Parliament. The Council of Ministers is the executive branch 
of the central government, responsible for carrying out policies in a number of 
areas including foreign and monetary policy (Gow, 1997).  
 The democratization process in Bosnia is subject to ridicule by some 
because the U.N. maintains a representative in the government with the power to 
bypass the Parliament and remove elected officials. This High Representative was 
originally appointed to help implement the new constitution, while maintaining 
contact with important international actors (Gow, 1997). However, many 
Bosnians have grown to resent the High Representative because of his ability to 
undermine Bosnian institutions. Here we see again the same process in Northern 
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Ireland and Bosnia, but with different outcomes. Northern Ireland’s 
democratization took place when the British government implemented devolution 
and created the Northern Ireland Assembly, which governs with minimal 
supervision by the central government. Democratization in Bosnia was more 
complex, for it established not only a regional governmental body, but an entire 
federal institution as well. The international community played a significant role 
to resolve the conflict in Bosnia and thus continued its presence there to ensure 
the peace lasted. However, this inhibits the people of Bosnia from reaching true 
democracy because the U.N. can interfere with their government’s policies. The 
democratization process is certainly incomplete in Bosnia, but one should not 
overlook the important steps taken since Dayton towards creating stable, 
democratic institutions.  
 The demobilization of the three ethnic groups began after the formal 
signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995. External pressure from the 
international community forced the three sides to normalize relations, cooperate 
with the War Crimes Tribunal, and end Serbia and Croatia’s shipments of arms to 
their ethnic communities within Bosnia. In addition, the international pressured 
the Serb and Croat leaders to refuse recognition of any independent Bosnian-Serb 
or Bosnian-Croat state. Duffy and Lindstrom argue that the Serb and Croat 
leaders did not fully comply with these pressures. As in Northern Ireland, the 
leaders struggled to convince their constituents (and themselves) that entering into 
relations with their old enemies and adhering to international pressure were 
beneficial. The leaders walked a delicate line, trying to satisfy both the 
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international community and domestic hardliners (Duffy & Lindstrom, 2002). The 
normalization of relations began in 1996. However, both the Serbs and Croats 
resisted arresting war criminals for the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and the Croats struggled to detach themselves from the 
Bosnian-Croats because of internal pressure from hardliners (Duffy & Lindstrom, 
2002). Like Northern Ireland, we see that the demobilization process is quite 
difficult. Removing solidary incentives used to rally support at the beginning of 
the conflict and reversing the demonic image of the enemy is a strenuous but 
crucial task to successfully ending conflicts. This process takes generations to 
subside completely. Fortunately, the demobilization in Bosnia was effective in 
creating peace, which continues to endure today.   
 This brief look into the Bosnian War of the early 1990s demonstrates how 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s causal mechanisms and processes allow us to 
compare a wide range of conflicts across a broad political spectrum. On the 
surface, the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Bosnia share only a few features. 
However, when analyzing the two conflicts through the lens of the contentious 
politics thesis, more similarities emerge that illustrate that mechanisms and 
processes are not limited to one specific conflict. Rather, they can be identified in 
a variety of contexts allowing us to comparatively study the actions of political 
actors around the world. Identifying object shift, opportunity spiral, 
democratization, and demobilization illustrate that, though the political situation 
in Northern Ireland and Bosnia may differ, the tactical approach of negotiating a 




After comparing and contrasting the Sunningdale, Anglo-Irish, and Good 
Friday Agreements through the lens of contentious politics, several causal 
mechanisms and processes are identifiable, which help further explain the failure 
of the first two agreements and the success of the third. For example, anti-
Sunningdale unionists successfully utilized the processes of object shift and social 
appropriation to force the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement. By bonding 
together and employing the Ulster Workers’ Council, they successfully made their 
claim against the Agreement and helped cause its downfall. In the aftermath of the 
signing of the AIA, the massive collective action movement organized by the 
unionists severely damaged the prestige of the agreement and caused further 
polarization. Once again, unionists’ claim-makers auspiciously inhibited the 
effectiveness of a settlement and strongly contributed to the lack of improvement 
made after its implementation. Finally, learning from the failures of Sunningdale 
and the AIA, the co-optation of Sinn Féin into the peace process, the identity shift 
of the Republic of Ireland, and the overall disillusionment by the majority of 
actors towards violence helped create the long-lasting success of the GFA. 
Strongly contributing to that success is the coalition formed between the DUP and 
Sinn Féin in the Northern Ireland Assembly, which ensured the continuation of a 
democratic system of government in Northern Ireland. Identifying causal 
mechanisms and processes in Bosnia re-affirmed McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s 
point that parallels can be drawn from the ways apparently disparate forms of 
contention work. Recognizing a mechanism, for example object shift, in the two 
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conflicts, which both ended in relatively stable peace, indicates that this 
mechanism may be important to producing a lasting peace. The object shift in 
Northern Ireland brought the nationalist community together, creating a single 
‘pan-nationalist’ front, which accelerated the peace process. Similarly, the 
formation of the Muslim-Croat Federation created one front against the Bosnian-
Serbs and ended their dominance on the battlefield. An example of a process that 
may be important to producing lasting peace is the democratization in both 
conflicts. The government bodies created in Northern Ireland and Bosnia have 
built-in features to prevent the implementation of discriminatory policies against 
any community.  Therefore, when studying other peacefully resolved conflicts, 
one should be aware that this mechanism or process may be present in the 
resolution process. This piece demonstrates the dynamic capability of the 
contentious politics thesis by identifying causal mechanisms and processes, which 
greatly enhances previous explanations for the failure of the Sunningdale and 
Anglo-Irish Agreements and the success of the Good Friday Agreement.  
Reflection on the Contentious Politics Thesis 
 When starting this work, I wanted to know whether the contentious 
politics thesis could explain why the GFA endured while its predecessors failed. 
At the time, I believed the thesis would successfully explain this inquiry. Upon 
completing this paper, my belief was confirmed. The thesis furthered my 
understanding of the triumphs and failures of each agreement and helped explain 
why it took three decades to broker a lasting peace. In particular, when I was 
looking for causal mechanisms and processes in the build-up to the signing of the 
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GFA, I found that I could trace its origins with greater ease compared to simply 
examining the historical events. It became clear to me that the mechanisms and 
processes, starting with the brokerage between the constitutional and republican 
nationalists, combined to facilitate the signing of the GFA. The brokerage led to 
the object shift in the nationalist community. The object shift contributed to the 
certification of Sinn Féin by President Clinton, which pressured the British 
government to open all-party talks, leading to the co-optation of Sinn Féin. 
Subsequently, with the majority of the key actors taking part in the negotiations 
(the exception being the DUP), the Republic of Ireland chose to withdraw its 
territorial claims to Northern Ireland, indicating a significant identity shift. The 
contentious politics thesis allows us to string the events together and comprehend 
on a more analytical level how the GFA came into existence. With a greater 
comprehension of the chain of events that led to the cessation of a conflict, the 
thesis serves another purpose, which is to recognize similarities between 
apparently different forms of contention. After working with the contentious 
politics thesis for several months, I firmly believe that McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly’s work greatly advances the study of contention, and their thesis can better 
our comprehension of all varieties of conflicts. The authors successfully 
accomplished their goal of “identifying parallels in the ways that apparently 
disparate forms of contention work, and showing how their differences result 
from varying combinations and sequences of mechanisms in contrasting regime 
environments” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). Students across a wide spectrum of 
educational levels can effectively apply this thesis towards a greater 
56 
 
understanding of the conflicts that plague our world and, more importantly, a 
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Appendix 1: Glossary of Mechanisms and Processes 
 
Mechanisms 
Boundary activation/deactivation: the creation of new boundary or crystallization 
of an existing one between challenging factions and their targets.  
Boundary formation: creation of an us-them distinction between two political 
actors. 
Brokerage: production of a new connection between previously unconnected or 
weakly connected sites. 
Category Formation: creates identities by means of three different sub-
mechanisms, through invention, borrowing, and encounter. 
Certification: an external authority’s signal of its readiness to recognize and 
support the existence and claims of a political actor. 
Co-optation: incorporation of a previously excluded political actor into some 
center of power. 
Defection: exit of a political actor from a previously effective coalition and/or 
coordinated action. 
Object Shift: the alteration in relations between claimants and objects of claims. 
Opportunity Spiral: operate through sequences of environmental change, 
interpretation of that change, actions, and counteraction, repeated as one action 
alters another actor’s environment. 
Repression: action by authorities that increases the cost—actual or potential—of 
an actor’s claim making.  
 
Processes 
Actor Constitution: emergence of a new or transformed political actor 
Coalition Formation: creation of new, visible, and direct coordination of claims 
between two or more previously distinct actors. 
Collective Action: all coordinating efforts on behalf of shared interests or 
programs. 
Competition: pursuit of rewards or outcomes in mutually exclusive ways. 
Contention: making claims that bear on someone else’s interests. 
Convergence: the coming together of moderate groups of conflicting viewpoints 
in opposition to radicalization. 
Demobilization: decrease in the resources available to a political actor for 
collective making of claims. 
Democratization: movement of a regime toward relatively broad, equal, and 
protected binding consultation of the government’s subjects with respect to 
government resources, personnel, and policies.  
Disillusionment: decline in the commitment of individuals or political actors to 
previously sustaining beliefs. 
Escalation: displacement of moderate goals and tactics by more extreme goals 
and tactics. 
Identity shift: emergence of new collective answers to the questions “Who are 
you?” “Who are we?” and “Who are they?” 
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Polarization: increasing ideological distance between political actors or 
coalitions. 
Radicalization: shift of social movement organizations toward increasing analysis 
Scale Shift: increase or decrease in the number and level of coordinated 
contentious actions leading to broader or narrower contention involving a wider 
or smaller range of actors.  
Self-representation: an actor’s or coalition’s public display of worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment.  
Social Appropriation: conversion or incorporation of previously existing 


































Appendix 2: Abbreviations 
 
AIA:  Anglo-Irish Agreement 
DUP:  Democratic Unionist Party 
GFA:  Good Friday Agreement 
IRA:  Irish Republican Army 
NICRA:  Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association 
NILP:  Northern Ireland Labour Party 
PUP:  Progressive Unionist Party 
RUC:  Royal Ulster Constabulary 
SDLP:  Social Democratic and Labour Party 
UKUP:  UK Unionist Party 
UDR:  Ulster Democratic Party 
UUC:  Ulster Unionist Council 
UUP:  Ulster Unionist Party 
UWC:  Ulster Workers’ Council 














Figure 2: Northern Ireland Assembly Elections. Source:  Economic 
"Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 1973." Note: Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP).
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Figure 4: 2007 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections. Source: Economic and Social Research Council, 

















































Dumping (left over from the autumn)       I say something bland to make him grin, 
Dead leaves, near a culvert                        But his glass eyes look past my side  
I come on                                                   - whiskers down 
          a British Soldier                                        the Shore Road Street. 
With a rifle and a radio                              I am an Irishman 
Perched hiding. He has red hair                          and he is afraid 
                                                                   That I have come to kill him 
He is young enough to be my weenie 
-bopper daughter’s boyfriend. 
He is like a lonely little winter robin. 
We are that close to each other, I  
Can nearly hear his heart beating. 
 
 
I chose to open this summary with the above poem because when first 
reading it I thought of how, in such a brief way, it provided a glimpse into the 
turbulent lives of those who lived in Northern Ireland during the “Troubles.” The 
“Troubles” is the term often used to describe the conflict between nationalists and 
unionists in Northern Ireland, starting in the late 1960s and concluding, for the 
most part, in 1998. The nationalists generally support a united Ireland, while the 
unionists favor keeping Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. My Capstone 
specifically examines the Sunningdale, Anglo-Irish, and Good Friday Agreements 
that emerged over the course of the “Troubles” through the lens of Doug 
McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly’s contentious politics thesis. The 
overall argument of my Capstone is that the contentious politics thesis furthers 
our understanding of the triumphs and failures of each agreement and helps 
explain why it took three decades to produce a lasting peace.  
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 My Capstone begins with a concise history of contentious events in 
Ireland from 1600 to the division of Ireland into North and South in 1922. It 
should be noted that contention between the people of Ireland and Great Britain 
dates back to the Norman invasion of Ireland in 1169. However, for the purpose 
of this work I start with the 17th Century for this marks, particularly after Oliver 
Cromwell’s invasion of Ireland, the origins of the conflict in Northern Ireland 
over 300 years later. Cromwell’s conquest and subsequent colonization of Ireland 
brought Ireland out of a dormant stage and provided the spark that led to the 
political turmoil and upheaval in the 17th, 18th, 19th centuries, culminating in the 
push for independence and establishment of the Irish Free State in the 1921. In 
my history, I go into depth about key events and actors in the each century from 
1600 to the fight for Irish independence in the early 20th Century. Included in this 
are Cromwell’s invasion and colonization of Ireland; the 1798 uprising by the 
United Irishmen under the leadership of Wolfe Tone; the distinguished political 
careers of Daniel O’Connell and Charles Stewart Parnell in the 19th Century; the 
Easter Rising in 1916; the Irish War for Independence from 1919-1921 and the 
subsequent Irish Civil War from 1921-1923. The purpose of this historical 
background is to put the “Troubles” into context with the larger contentious 
history of Ireland. In addition, it serves to provide important information about 
how the “Troubles” came about and why such strong tensions exist between the 
nationalist and unionist communities in Northern Ireland.  
 The next section of my Capstone provides background information for the 
three agreements. This includes the key events that facilitated the signing of each 
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agreement and the reaction to each in both the nationalist and unionist 
communities. For example, the Sunningdale Agreement emerged out of the 
turmoil of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Notable events from this period include 
the Catholic Civil Rights movement, the deployment of the British Army to 
Northern Ireland, and the internment without trial of anyone suspected of 
association with paramilitary groups, which discriminated against nationalists. 
The final event that spurred the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement was 
“Bloody Sunday”, when 13 Catholic protestors were shot and killed by British 
troops, causing the British government to subsequently dissolve Northern 
Ireland’s government and institute direct rule from London. The Sunningdale 
Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1974 and created a power-sharing 
executive body, with the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the centrist Alliance 
Party forming a ruling coalition. The power-sharing executive lacked the support 
of the unionist community, which would ultimately undermine the agreement 
after only a few months, forcing the British government to reinstate direct rule. 
The rest of this segment provides similar details for the Anglo-Irish and Good 
Friday Agreements. It also includes a comparison of the three agreements to 
highlight the changes made to the later agreements in the effort to create a lasting 
peace and to help illustrate why the first two failed to do so.   
The following section examines the three agreements through the lens of 
the contentious politics thesis. Prior to going into more detail, I must explain the 
thesis. McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow developed the thesis after continual frustration 
with the compartmentalization of studies concerning political struggle. In place of 
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the “static, single-actor models (including their own) that have prevailed in the 
field,” they identify causal mechanisms and processes that recur across a wide-
range of contentious politics and “shift the focus of analysis to dynamic 
interaction” (2001). This is not a theory, for as Tilly and Tarrow state in their 
book Contentious Politics “the contentious politics approach looks deliberately 
for similarities in cause-effect relationships across the wide range of political 
struggles without aiming for general laws that govern all of politics” (2007). The 
purpose of the thesis is not to examine various forms of contention (i.e. coups, 
civil wars, revolutions) one by one and make broad generalizations for each of 
them. Quite the opposite; the goal is to “identify parallels in the ways that 
apparently disparate forms of contention work, and show how their differences 
result from varying combinations and sequences of mechanisms in contrasting 
regime environments” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). The thesis allows us to recognize 
trends amid various types of conflicts. It argues that, though contentious situations 
exist on a wide spectrum, similar causal mechanisms and processes are present in 
all of them, helping to explain how contentious events occur. In this work, I use 
the conflict in Northern Ireland as a case study to test the thesis and determine if 
identifying causal mechanisms and processes in the buildup and aftermath of each 
agreement can explain why the Good Friday Agreement was the only one to 
experience relatively long-term success. To make clear what mechanisms and 
processes are being discussed, I italicize them throughout the text. A full glossary 
for the mechanisms and processes discussed is available at the back of the work in 
Appendix 1. Tilly and Tarrow define mechanisms as “a delimited class of events 
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that alter relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar 
ways over a variety of situations” (2007). Mechanisms compound into processes, 
which “are regular combinations and sequences of mechanisms that produce 
similar transformations of those elements” (2007). As I illustrate in the paper, 
recognizing causal mechanisms and processes that occurred during the buildup 
and aftermath of the GFA does explain why it held up compared to the previous 
two agreements. The object shift by the nationalist community, the co-optation of 
Sinn Féin into the peace talks, and the identity shift by the Republic of Ireland are 
some examples of the causal mechanisms and processes that separated the GFA 
from Sunningdale and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA).  
 Following this, I include a comparative section with the Bosnian War 
(1992-95) to help illustrate how the same causal mechanisms and processes can 
be identified in two distinct conflicts. Object shift, opportunity spirals, 
democratization, and demobilization all recur over the course of the conflict in 
Bosnia and the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland. The road to peace certainly 
differed between the two; however, the comparison serves as an excellent 
example of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s point that parallels can be drawn from 
the ways apparently disparate forms of contention work. Within this segment, I 
provide a short history of the Bosnian War and then enter into detail about how 
each of the mechanisms and processes mentioned above played out in Bosnia, 




 I conclude by reaffirming my belief that the contentious politics thesis 
provides a more dynamic analysis of and further explains the failure of the first 
two agreements and the success of the third. I also touch on the lessons the 
negotiating parties learned after the failures of Sunningdale and the AIA that 




 The main method used for this work is researching books and articles 
written on the subject. This includes primary source documents, in particular the 
memoirs of people participating in the events discussed and newspaper articles 
published at the time. Fortunately, this subject has been well documented over the 
years and many of these records were accessible. The books and articles generally 
fell into two categories: the historical record and material related to the 
contentious politics thesis. McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow’s Dynamics of Contention 
and Tilly and Tarrow’s Contentious Politics were essential for the identification 
of the causal mechanisms and processes. Paul Dixon’s Northern Ireland: The 
Politics of War and Peace provided me with a highly accessible and detailed 
history of the “Troubles.” With the large amount of information available on 
Northern Ireland, combined with the works of McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow, 








 I believe my Capstone Project makes a significant contribution in support 
of the contentious politics thesis. I chose to use Northern Ireland as the case study 
for this project for many reasons. In term of academics, I am majoring in history 
and political science. My thesis allowed me to utilize the skills I have developed 
working towards my majors. On a more personal level, I come from an Irish 
background. Both sides of my family can trace their ancestry to Ireland. This 
connection drew my initial curiosity in studying Ireland and my interest has only 
grown since. In addition, in the fall of 2010 I studied abroad in London. Before 
arriving in England, I participated in a ten-day seminar in Ireland, five days in 
Dublin and five in Belfast. Prior to this, I had never studied Ireland formally in 
my academic career. This experience, especially in Belfast, with political 
divisions still evident, fueled my desire to study Irish politics, particularly the 
“Troubles.” I believe the case study superbly exemplified the dynamic capabilities 
of the contentious politics thesis by identifying causal mechanisms and processes, 
which greatly enhances previous explanations for the failure of the Sunningdale 
and Anglo-Irish Agreements and the success of the Good Friday Agreement. I 
understand that the thesis that this paper is centered on is not my own, but the 
thorough analysis of the “Troubles” through the lens of the contentious politics 
thesis is an original work. One that I believe enhances the study of contentious 
politics.  
 
 
 
